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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I address some philosophical questions regarding the impact quantum 
mechanics has in the classical conceptions about reality and knowledge. I stress that 
onto-gnosiological realism still is an option to the issues regarding the relationship 
between knowledge and reality. Rejecting some radical aspects of Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum formalism, I emphasize the advantages of de Broglie’s 
realistic and causal model. To finish with, I discuss the limits of the Cartesian concept 
of matter and the split between matter and mind. 
 
Keywords: Realism, Quantum Mechanics, Gnosiology, Natural Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
Philosophers dramatically misunderstand the sense of their task when they embra-
ce a kind of scholasticism, writing entire books about the opinions of other distingui-
shed philosophers instead of talking about the things themselves. Unfortunately, this has 
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become a widespread situation since philosophy was confused with the history of philo-
sophy. This kind of category-mistake was first committed by Hegel. After him, in the 
late 19th century, with Dilthey and others, it degenerated into a historicism of sceptical 
and relativistic guises. However, before philosophy came to this regrettable situation, 
philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz, Kant –or even Helmholtz, to mention only a case 
of a nineteen-century philosopher of non-Hegelian extraction– were concerned with the 
formidable task of producing an organized and sound understanding of reality. They 
were not worried about erudite questions concerning the history of philosophy, nor did 
they come to their own opinions reading the philosophers of the past. The lack of his-
torical erudition was a common feature of thinkers and natural philosophers like Bruno, 
Galileo, Descartes, Newton or even Kant. Instead, they were fully aware of the scien-
tific atmosphere of their time. Indeed, it was the accuracy of their answers to problems 
concerning our knowledge of reality that gave them the label of classical scientific 
thinkers and philosophers. 
Surely, I am not making a case for ignorance and lack of relevant information. I 
am only suggesting that the kind of dialogue we should have with other philosophers is 
one which proves capable of improving our knowledge of reality – that is: a dialogue 
not for the sake of interpretation, but for the sake of truth. 
This productive attitude towards the intellectual legacy of philosophy is particu-
larly appropriate in our times. In fact, we are experiencing the aftermath of an intense 
intellectual turmoil, which has taken place in the 20th century and has shaken the very 
foundations of the classical image of reality that three hundreds of continuous scientific 
developments had given us. The turmoil started in the first three decades of the last cen-
tury. It was centred on the conception –or a lack thereof– of reality that recent advance-
ments in physics and cosmology were suggesting. This debate about the ideas that new 
physics and cosmology were dramatically changing and reshaping engaged outstanding 
researchers like Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Einstein, Schrödinger, de Broglie, Bohm, de 
Sitter, Gamow, Hoyle, and so many others. The hard work they did was not related to 
physics or cosmology in a narrow sense. It was too deep and far-reaching to be locked-
up in a particular science. In fact, it spread to domains like gnosiology and ontology, 
i.e., it entailed a revision –or at least a reappraisal– of such basic ideas as our general 
conceptions of reality, the material Universe and knowledge. 
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As a matter of fact, regarding our scientific knowledge and technical domination 
of nature, the 20th century was a time of astonishing progress. For the first time since the 
Greek split between theoria and techne, the capabilities for a technical transformation 
were systematically linked with science, sometimes benefiting from its achievements, at 
other times promoting them. These achievements embraced the smallest as well as the 
largest structures of nature – they went from the atomic and subatomic structures to 
stars, galaxies and the formation of the cosmos. Two new theoretical constructions 
guided this amazing progress: quantum mechanics, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the complex and not-so-straightforward conglomerate of observations, hypotheses and 
hard speculations that extended from Einstein’s Kosmologische Betrachtungen zur all-
gemeinen Relativitätstheorie, published early in 1917, to the Big Bang theory and the 
standard cosmological models of today. 
Alongside this extraordinary growth, a baffling situation emerged: our classical 
image of nature was becoming more and more blurred but, despite the enormous work 
of the fathers of quantum mechanics and modern cosmology, nothing very clear, well 
defined and uncontroversial was put in its place. This is tantamount to saying that mod-
ern physics and cosmology have put us in the middle of a crisis. Physics, particularly 
quantum mechanics in the prevailing “Copenhagen Interpretation” by Bohr and his 
associates, suggested a non-causal and rather indeterminist behaviour of atomic and 
subatomic entities, proposing a puzzling description of the deepest structures of matter. 
In fact, quantum jumps (assumed by Bohr since 1913, when he was in Rutherford’s la-
boratory at Manchester), wave-particle duality and the complementarity-principle 
(Bohr’s way out of the conundrum of the double-slit experiment), the collapse of the 
wave-function (attributing a kind of creative power to measuring acts), and the new in-
terpretation of quantum probabilities (which was Bohr’s appropriation of Schrödinger’s 
equation), lead to a non-causal, rather indeterminist and mind-dependent conception of 
reality. The question concerning Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, especially 
his considerations about the principle of complementarity, was not meant to bring for-
ward a new understanding of the atomic and subatomic world, but to signal some un-
breakable limits in the human efforts to understand nature. With quantum mechanics, 
we had eventually a mathematical formalism with extraordinary predictive capabilities 
but no clear interpretation of the physical meaning of these very formulae we managed 
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to put together so well. Bohr himself wrote on this subject several times, so that his 
interpretation sounds as a farewell to a full understanding of nature as such. On the 
other hand, modern cosmology, based both on Einstein’s equations of general relativity 
(without the cosmological constant) and on the interpretation of the galactic red-shift, 
discovered by Hubble, as a Doppler-effect, led to the idea of an expanding universe that 
at earlier times was much hotter and denser than today. Tracing this expansion back-
wards and supposing it was permanent, cosmologists constructed the hazardous hy-
pothesis of a definite time in the past when the universe would have been infinitely 
dense. This time, the genuine “beginning” of the Universe, as we are told in a somewhat 
biblical fashion, has come to be called the “Big Bang”, ironically the very same name 
Hoyle used for mocking it. 
In a word, despite the independent paths they have treaded during the 20th century, 
quantum mechanics in “Kopenhagener Geist” and Bing Bang cosmology have together 
given an indelible sense of strangeness both to physical matter and to the Universe as a 
whole. Regarding cosmology, with the guiding hypothesis of an expansion, both the old 
cosmogonist ways of thinking and the idea of the creation of the material Universe were 
revitalized. Despite new questions, like those pertaining to the overall geometry of the 
Universe (if it is flat or otherwise) as determined by the value of the Omega Cosmologi-
cal Parameter, we are now facing some old-fashioned problems like the alleged begin-
ning and end of the Universe, its duration, its finite or infinite magnitude in space-time, 
and so on – problems that remind us of some metaphysical queries of the past and also 
of the lessons Kant gave us about it in the Antinomies of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 
In addition to this, we are facing the perplexing situation of a singularity to which the 
laws of physics no longer apply, so that the very beginning of the Universe (earlier then 
the so-called “Planck epoch”), postulated by cosmology, is no longer a matter of phys-
ics but of some inexplicable processes that took place nobody knows how and why. 
This puzzling singularity is, then, the point where physis comes to an end and conceals 
both its nature and origin. On the other hand, the classical conception of physical matter 
as something fully determined and submitted to necessary causal laws has been strongly 
challenged by particle physics. Furthermore, with the complementarity-principle and the 
putative impossibility of attributing determined states to a system before measuring op-
erations, some strong general ontological conceptions about what a being is and about 
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the relationship between reality and consciousness (knowledge) were challenged; we do 
not know if the principle according to which every being is necessarily fully determined 
in all its states is actually a good principle to characterize reality or, on the contrary, an 
oversimplification based on the apparent constancy and completion of objects of our 
macroscopic perceptual world; we also do not know if we can retain a mind-independ-
ent, non-idealist conception of reality. As a result, we are comfortable neither episte-
mologically nor metaphysically or even scientifically, given the rather confused image 
we now have of the Universe we live in. As everyone can see, more than the right an-
swers, we are in need of the right questions, because we do not know if contemporary 
trends in physics and cosmology are on the good paths at all. In face of so many conun-
drums and seemingly dead ends (particularly in the standard cosmological model), we 
do not need more physics and more cosmology conducted in the usual ways, but, in-
stead of this, we need a lot of critical discussions about the very foundations of physics 
and cosmology and possibly some really new physics and some really new cosmology 
in the ways these critical discussions will pave for us. In a word: we need to turn back to 
the open space of philosophy. 
For this is, in fact, a matter of philosophical inquiry, a problem for a natural philo-
sopher, not as somebody who reads (all) but as someone who (incompletely) responds 
to the huge problems reality addresses to us. A gigantomachia peri tes ousias, i.e., a 
battle of giants concerning what is, as Plato wrote: this is what philosophy is really 
about. 
So we will address the following questions: 
In what relationship does knowledge stand to reality? Is reality conceptually inde-
pendent of knowledge? 
What is it to know? How can we describe the chain of cognitive operations that 
must take place, so that we can go from (the bare existence of) x to the (cognitive) situa-
tion x-is-know? Do classical conceptions about knowledge still hold? 
And what is a being after all, an ens, to take up again the Latin jargon of the old 
metaphysics and ontology? Can we conceive a being which is not fully determined re-
garding all possible predicates that can be attributed to it? Does causality hold univer-
sally if there is something like non-complete determination? 
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Finally, what is physis? Is physis fully understandable through the classical Gali-
leo-Cartesian concepts of physics? And if not, what else do we need? In light of particle 
physics, can we have a cosmogenetic conception for physis as a whole? 
 
 
1 – Reality and knowledge: in search of a conceptual clarification  
 
Reality is prior to knowledge. Yet, the traditional way of defining this priority 
(viz., reality is what it is regardless of being known or not) is not entirely accurate. 
The word “prior” above means a relation determined by the semantic content of 
concepts alone, not a temporal relation or a genetic one between the things referred to 
by the concepts. So the proposition does not mean that reality comes before knowledge 
or that knowledge springs from reality. It means that, in order to define the concept of 
knowledge, we must presuppose the concept of reality and attribute some content to it 
that is independent of any relationship to knowledge. So we must define precisely what 
this independent content is. 
To begin with, let us say something about the priority-relation that holds between 
reality and knowledge. It has several meanings that are interrelated. Nevertheless, they 
do not imply each other. Going from the weakest to the stronger, they are the following: 
(i) A particular sense of aboutness. Like perceiving, imagining, supposing, and so 
on, knowing is always about something, i.e., it has a content we can describe. Unlike the 
other forms, however, if, say, it is true that p is known (for instance, if it is known that 
the Earth is a planet of the Solar System), then p is the case, i.e., “p” can be asserted as a 
true proposition. The same does not happen in cases like imagining that p, supposing 
that p, thinking, or even perceiving, because from the truth of “I suppose that p” it does 
not follow that p must be the case and that “p” can be asserted as true. Indeed, “I sup-
pose that p” can be true and “p” false, or inversely. If I suppose that Scott was the first 
man to arrive at the South Pole, my supposition is wrong, but it is nevertheless true that 
I have such a supposition. On the contrary, if I say that I know Scott was the first man to 
arrive to the South Pole, the falsity of the assertion implies that it is not the case that I 
have authentic knowledge. So, unlike the other cases (supposing, imagining, thinking, 
 7 
and so on), I cannot say here that “p” is false and that “I know that p” is true: if p is 
false I do not have any knowledge at all. 
So only what is the case qualifies as an actual or possible object of knowledge, 
and, therefore, knowledge is always about what is. For instance, we cannot know any-
thing about the Olympic gods because they do not exist. However, the cultural facts of 
ancient Greece are real, and we can know them, namely the stories about fictional char-
acters like Zeus or Poseidon. As a general rule, we must say: if it is true that p is known, 
then p is the case (we cannot say yet what the criteria of true knowledge are). The nega-
tive judgments (e.g., “Earth is not a star”) express no cognizance of unrealities as such, 
but a cognition that it is the case that something is not true (viz., that “Earth is a star” is 
a false proposition). The sum of all that is the case is what we call here “reality” in a 
wide sense, including what is actual, possible, probable, and so on. Reality is what au-
thentic knowledge asserts, even when this true knowledge is not about an actuality but, 
say, a possibility, a probability, or something else (if it is true that p is probable, then it 
is the case that this probability is a “real” state of affairs). Being real is, then, a neces-
sary condition for being known. On the contrary, if one thing or state of affairs is real, it 
does not immediately follow that it is or can be known. So being-real is not a sufficient 
condition for being-known. 
(ii) Irreducibility. Knowledge is about reality, but reality is irreducible to knowl-
edge. This does not simply mean that there are always more aspects and domains of rea-
lity to be known. Such an assertion would be a matter of common sense and an ever-
lasting but trivial truth. This does not mean either that there are absolute limits to 
knowledge. That would be a very controversial gnosiological thesis. The proposition 
that states here the irreducibility of reality to knowledge means that what is effectively 
known is always conceptually understandable and explainable in another theoretical 
framework. It states, then, that there is no ultimate theory that captures reality –a “the-
ory mirror”, so to speak– because there is no “true image of reality” as such, but only 
reality under a certain description in a determinate conceptual framework. For instance, 
gravitation phenomena can be conceptually grasped and explained in terms of concepts 
like force, action at a distance, absolute space, or in terms of space-time curvature, 
matter-energy density, tensors, and so on. The conceptual universes are pretty different, 
but the underlying phenomena are very much the same, with a somewhat changing de-
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gree of observational accuracy determined by the conceptual and mathematical sophis-
tication of each theory. 
So we must distinguish between the conceptual and (if any) mathematical frame-
work of a theory, on the one hand, and the underlying material nucleus, on the other 
hand, i.e., the material kernel of what the theory is about. We cannot say: “the underly-
ing material facts”, because a fact is almost always the function of a theory – it is al-
ready a reality under a determinate description. So, for a theory like the ancient Atom-
ism, the falling-down of atoms in void was a fact. Atomists could even “see” it in phe-
nomena like the fall of bodies on Earth. Nevertheless, for Newton’s conception of an 
absolute, homogeneous physical space, there are no such facts as the falling-down of 
bodies: the facts are, instead of this, the uniform and accelerated motions due to the ac-
tion of forces, namely the gravitational force, for the case of those fall-phenomena on 
Earth that experience immediately shows to us. Thus our description of the facts varies 
–or simply the facts vary– as the theories that imply them change. 
So, if we look at reality as irreducible to any form of conceptual thinking, no mat-
ter how successful it can be, we must realize that there is no privileged form of access to 
it. The thesis that perception, as a supposed pre-conceptual, pre-theoretical experience, 
would be the original form for the presentation of reality –a thesis put forward, in phe-
nomenology, by Merleau-Ponty and, to a certain extent, by Husserl himself– must be 
denounced as an illusion. This is so, firstly, because perception is already a conceptual 
grasping of reality, and, secondly, because perception, as a presentation of nature, en-
tails a kind of “folk-physics”, so to speak, as it suggests a conception of physical reality 
in terms of sensible qualities, the four elements, material bodies and forces, psychic 
causes for movements, and a lot of oppositions like day-night, earth-sky, plenum-void, 
etc. Perception is not an original or trustworthy, but an anthropological, culturally laden, 
conceptual and sensible presentation of reality: it has no special rights, neither regarding 
originality nor regarding truth. Considering reality by itself amounts to taking notice of 
certain recurrent regularities and patterns of organization as a basis for conceptual for-
mation. For instance, some regular kinetic phenomena, like the behaviour of bodies on 
Earth’s surface, give the empirical basis for different conceptual understandings and 
theoretical constructions, like Aristotle’s theory of natural places or Newton’s gravita-
tion law, which are applicable to the same patterns of earthly kinetic regularity. 
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If, on the other hand, we look to the multiple forms of theoretical thinking, we 
must acknowledge its relativity, but not embrace relativism. Actually, theories are not 
equivalent, and the election of one is not a matter of free choice. There are constraints. 
The refusal of an “ultimate theory” (the irreducibility-thesis) inhibits us from talking 
about a progressive approximation to the “true image” of reality. Nevertheless, this is 
not tantamount to accepting Kuhnian conceptions about the discontinuities of paradigm 
shifts and their incommensurability, or to talk about the supposed loss of theoretical ex-
planatory power in the substitution of one theory for another, as pointed out by Laudan, 
while discussing birefringence in face of Huygens’ and Newton’s optical conceptions. 
There is progress in the succession of theories: that Newton’s gravitational theory is 
more accurate than Aristotle’s theory of natural places is a blatantly truth. Furthermore, 
partial losses of explicative power are compensated in the long run, as in the case of the 
return to an explanation of birefringence in terms of the wave-theory of light in the 19th 
century. In general, theories fit or do not fit a number of phenomena and regularities 
already known. Theories have or do not have the capability of predicting new phenom-
ena. Theories can grow or not, and are able, or not, to assimilate other theories. These 
are just some of the constraints determining the election of one theory. 
We started by saying that reality is what true propositions assert. We now reach a 
deeper understanding. Reality is what true propositions of competing theories are about, 
i.e., the underlying phenomena and regularities. Surely, phenomena are only expressible 
in a conceptual framework (as “facts of the theory”); nevertheless, phenomena are al-
ways able to say “no” to theories and explanations. In a rough sketch, we could say that 
propositions “A < B” and “B > A” express the same metric state of affairs between A 
and B. The state of affairs by itself is not expressible without the point of view of one or 
the other propositions. Still, it makes good sense to say that the state of affairs is none of 
them, but the –unique– thing the two propositions are about. The relation between real-
ity and theoretical thinking is the same, with the qualification that some theories are 
better fitted than others both to express and to explain phenomena. 
(iii) Non-substitutability. Every attempt to ascribe to knowledge an object that is 
immanent to it will misconstrue and destroy the very concept of knowledge. 
In order to show this, let us considerer two classical cases that are instructive to 
several contemporary conceptions. British empiricism explained knowledge as a set of 
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“operations of the mind” over its own sense-data, by means of which an indirect cogni-
zance of an external reality was obtained, as John Locke put it. These directions in 
gnosiological thinking have led, with Hume and Berkeley, to a sceptical doubt about 
“external” reality and even to the denial of such a thing as a material, mind-independent 
world. As a matter of fact, when Berkeley put forward his thesis of immaterialism he 
was only extracting a radical consequence from the original presuppositions of Locke’s 
empiricism: if knowledge is constructed as a set of operations by the mind over sense-
data, the very concept of a mind-independent, external reality will be pointless and fruit-
less. So when Berkeley said famously that a Law of Nature was not a description of 
some processes taking place in a material universe, but simply a rule for predicting a set 
of future sensations given a particular set of present sensations, he was just taking the 
final step in full accordance with empiricist gnosiology – the total substitution of objec-
tive reality by predictions about our own future subjective observations as the very ob-
ject of knowledge. Maybe not so surprisingly, some formulations by Heisenberg about 
the kind of knowledge we have in quantum mechanics are not very far from this epis-
temic conception. As a matter of fact, since the very beginning, Heisenberg affirmed 
that his matrix mechanics was no more than an algorithm for correlating results of ex-
perimental observations and making new predictions on that basis. That is to say that his 
theory was unable to give some glimpses beyond the realm of our empirical observa-
tions – it was not a depiction of atomic reality. Surely, for Heisenberg and contrary to 
Berkeley’s standpoint, there is a reality underlying sensible objects (empirical objects). 
But –he insisted– statements about the physical world are statements about what we can 
experimentally perceive and verify, and so, science has no good grips beyond this empi-
rical level. These epistemic conceptions were so deeply rooted in Heisenberg’s mind 
that he reaffirmed them in 1962, long after his controversy with Schrödinger’s wave 
mechanics and the necessity he had of justifying the artificiality (from a physical point 
of view) of his matrix mechanics. Actually, in a text based on his Gifford-lectures, 
called Physik und Philosophie, he stated once more that scientific statements in quan-
tum mechanics were not about an underlying reality, but about our own knowledge, i.e. 
about predictions over probabilities of future observational states. 
The Kantian distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself was an attempt to 
overcome the sceptical trends stemming from the empiricist stance. The assumption of a 
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mind-independent reality was preserved by defending the possibility of thinking (not of 
cognizing) a realm of things in themselves, while, on the other hand, the empiricist con-
cept of sense-data was retained and transformed into the concept of an “appearing ob-
ject” (erscheinender Gegenstand) for knowledge, i.e., something that is not a state of 
mind, a simple sensation (it is already an object – Gegenstand), but something that, 
nevertheless, has an intuition and concept-dependent objectivity (it is still an appear-
ance to the mind – an Erscheinung). However, this Kantian conceptual distinction be-
tween a double way of considering things –as they are in themselves and as they appear 
to us– boils down to the following dilemma: either our cognition of appearances leads 
to the cognition of things as they are in themselves, so that the distinction cancels itself 
out, or our cognition of appearances does not lead to a cognizance of things as they are, 
so that the cognition we have is a fake presentation of reality. There is no way out of 
this dilemma. The very opposition between reality as it is as such and as it appears to us 
must be overthrown, not to mention that we do not fully understand what is really meant 
by expressions like “as such” and “to us”. A lot of conceptual work is in need here. 
So empiricism as well as Kantian gnosiology are classical cases of a construction 
of the object of knowledge as something immanent to knowledge itself. The concept of 
immanence we use here does not signify sheer interiority. As a matter of fact, while sen-
sations are internal in a psychological sense, Kantian phenomena are typically external 
objects in space and time (not considering another group of phenomena Kant calls “ob-
jects of the inner sense”, i.e., states of mind, Vorstellungen). Nevertheless, sense-data 
and phenomena (more precisely: appearing objects) are cases of immanent objects in the 
sense of something that has no independent existence outside its relationship to know-
ledge itself. And this is just the point. If the general purpose of knowledge is only the 
prediction of subjective observational states, the concept of reality does not need a pre-
cise definition and can be characterized as the unknown cause of sensations in the 
knowing subject. This unknown cause can be a material universe as well as God’s will 
or something else, as Berkeley emphasized (Berkeley himself supported the radical hy-
pothesis of God’s direct action without the mediation of a –for him superfluous– mate-
rial universe). But this entails that the concepts of science lose their foundation, because 
no relationship can be established between them and the ontological content of reality as 
such. As a matter of fact, we use concepts like space, body, mass, acceleration, field, 
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and so on, to pick out and bind sense-data. But we can no longer trace any connection 
between the content of these concepts and the unknown content of the “outside” reality. 
This is a clear admission that all our concepts have no basis at all and, thus, this counts 
as a self-destruction of the objectivity of knowledge itself. By the same token, the 
Kantian distinction between a world for us and a realm of things-in-themselves refers 
epistemic procedures back to the forms of intuition and the concepts of the knowing 
subject without any justification for the fact that he uses precisely these forms and these 
concepts and not any other forms or concepts. For instance, the forms of our intuition 
impose the presentation of a spatiotemporal world. But why do we have these forms and 
not others? Why must a spatiotemporal world exist (for us)? The Kantian answer (viz., 
because these are precisely the a priori forms of our faculty of intuition) is not good 
enough, for we would like to know why we have these forms instead of others and, in 
the end, if these forms are homogeneous or, at least, a good approximation to the para-
mount reality, i.e., the realm of things as they are when considered in themselves. 
So we cannot construct the concept of knowledge avoiding a reference to reality as 
such. If the object of knowledge is not a reality independent of the knowing operations, 
but just our observational future states or a (minor) object entirely dependent on our 
faculties of cognition –an object naively defined as being only “for us”–, we will con-
travene the normal sense of the concept of knowledge, which amounts to an intentional 
grasping of something that precedes the very acts that apprehend it, or, to say it some-
what more technically, to something that has not those very acts of cognition as a con-
dition for the possibility of its own existence. As a result, the concept of reality cannot 
be replaced by another in the definition of knowledge. If we say that knowledge is about 
predictions of observational states or about objects entirely constructed by our subjec-
tive forms of apprehension and thought, we will lose the very objectivity of knowledge, 
because we can no longer trace any relation between the concepts we use (like space, 
time, mass, force, field, etc.) and the very reality we have excluded from the outset from 
the definition of knowledge. 
Thus we get a final characterization of the way reality is prior to knowledge: the 
fundamental concepts of knowledge must give a sound presentation of reality as some-
thing whose existence is independent from the very operations by means of which it is 
known. That is to say: the fundamental concepts we use must give rise to a “realistic” 
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interpretation. In the present state of our knowledge, our fundamental concepts have im-
posed an interpretation of reality as a physical realm, and this physical realm as a do-
main of events understandable in terms of concepts such as mass, field, particle, wave, 
and so on. Yet this is not the final word on these matters. In accordance with what has 
been said, we reject the idea, so cherished by Schlick and Reichenbach, that physical 
knowledge is simply a matter of coordination (Zuordnung) between mathematical equa-
tions and sense-data. Fundamental concepts must lead to a coherent realistic representa-
tion, or just to a representation of a realm of physical reality, if we take for granted the 
assumption we do not want to discuss that the basic form of reality is physical reality. 
And so are we carried to the question: what is physis? 
But before that we must say something else about knowledge itself. 
 
 
2 – Reappraising realism: what is really in question in quantum physics? 
 
Bearing in mind what we said above, let us establish some important conclusions. 
First, if we are right, knowledge is bound to strive for the following goals: 
1. If, going away from the sterile womb of semantics, we associate to the proposi-
tional attitude report “I know that…” the idea of some procedure for obtaining know-
ledge, be it experimental or otherwise, so that the clause “I know that…” refers the state 
of knowing to a certain previous cognitive activity culminating in the verification that p 
is the case, then we can state what we will call from now on the “objectivity rule” 
(“OR” for short): 
OR: If I know that p, p is the case simpliciter and not just under the conditions it has been 
known, so that p can be released from the particular conditions under which it has been 
known and asserted as true regardless of any verification method. 
If the objectivity rule applies to the content of an assertion, e.g., “The average 
distance between the Sun and the Earth is 149 million kilometres”, this signifies that the 
physical state of affairs referred to by the statement is equally the same for a multiplici-
ty of different verification methods, so that it is independent of any disturbance a chosen 
measuring device could impinge on it. That is to say that an objectified assertion talks 
about some objective feature of reality invariant despite a change in verification me-
thod, i.e., it talks about what simply is the case, not about the results of an interaction 
 14 
between a physical system and a measuring device or about the proper states of the 
measuring apparatus. 
2. We have talked above about irreducibility as the second sense of priority. Let us 
extract one important lesson from that. 
Instead of the common but somewhat naïve conception that there are facts we can 
simply collect, we state that it is not possible to collect immediately facts from nature, 
but that they must be constituted through conceptual and methodological procedures. 
For instance, the fact of acceleration in Newton’s mechanics supposes the concepts of 
absolute space and time, as well as the mathematical method of fluxions, so that the 
concepts of applied force and inertial mass can subsequently intervene as explanatory 
concepts. Thus we must say that knowledge is not simply a matter of putting facts under 
explanatory concepts. The very facts we explain point back to constitutive concepts. 
These are not bound to direct empirical justification. They are kinds of postulates of 
empirical knowledge. Hence, there are several strata of disagreement between theories. 
They can disagree at the level of the explanation of facts, i.e., at the level of explanatory 
concepts (for instance, Doppler-effect versus tired-light as an overall explanation for the 
galactic red-shift), or they can disagree about the very facts they are facing, that is, at 
the level of the constitutive concepts and the mathematics associated with them. A clear 
example is the understanding of light as a wave or as a beam of particles (no need to 
say that the mathematical properties of waves and particles are pretty different). An-
other clear example is Thomson’s model and Rutherford-Bohr’s model as conflicting 
depictions of the inner structure of the atom. Whenever we arrive at a primary charac-
terization of the nature and structure of an entity, we use models of intelligibility that 
are constitutive concepts. Thus we go from phenomena to facts by means of constitutive 
concepts, and from facts to explicative theories by means of explanatory concepts, so 
that we can state a kind of hierarchy rule (HR) applying to the several layers of concept 
formation: 
HR: Constitutive concepts give structure to phenomena, converting them into facts; ex-
planatory concepts connect facts to other facts in dependence chains; a change in consti-
tutive concepts can change facts and often leads to the discovery of new realm of phe-
nomena; a change in explanatory concepts leads only to a new explanatory hypothesis. 
Explanatory concepts enter explicative theories that either fit or do not fit the facts 
already recognized; on the other hand, the justification of constitutive concepts lies 
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more deeply in its aptitude to give intelligible structure to phenomena, to disclose new 
realms of phenomena and to establish new kinds of facts. 
3. Finally, let us stress that, in accordance with the third sense of priority, to give a 
representation of an observer-independent reality is not to depict reality as it is without 
knowledge –this is a self-contradictory idea– nor to subtract the impact knowledge has 
on reality –this will bring us back to the point of departure–, but to accept what we will 
call from now on the “objective reasoning rule” (ORR). This rule allows us to think in 
terms of an objective reality that follows its own development independently of the cir-
cumstance of being proved by a measuring device or not. We can state it as follows: 
ORR: The state of any physical system is self-determined by its own laws of develop-
ment; two systems acquire new states at the moment of their interaction and pursue after 
that separated world lines; reasoning can anticipate what will be the future state of a sys-
tem relying solely on its past-story, so that our measuring devices do not create the states 
of physical systems, but merely prove an observer-independent reality. 
This condition used to be articulated as a demand for both causality and determin-
ism. In fact, causal thinking is a way of thinking “as if we were not there”, so to speak: 
we simply figure out what is happening. So causal thinking is intimately connected to 
the idea of an objective realm governed by its own laws. In addition, the separation of  
physical systems implies locality and the refusal of connections between events faster 
than any velocity of signal transmission (although we begin to suspect that time-like in-
tervals of space-time light cones are no limits at all for signal transmission –there are 
experimental grounds to admit superluminal velocity, i.e., space-like intervals with cau-
sal connection–, no instantaneous transmission of signals is compatible both with causal 
connection and separation of physical systems). Nevertheless, causal reasoning need not 
be deterministic in the classical way of defining it. As we will see, there are good rea-
sons to believe that, if we reach a deeper understanding of phenomena, laws of nature 
will incorporate processes of spontaneous generation of order and self-organization that 
are incompatible with a Laplacian, deterministic, linear approach. So we will retain cau-
sal thinking and locality in ORR, though we shall be ready to give-up determinism. 
We will call OR and ORR jointly the thesis of onto-gnosiological realism. 
Now, secondly, let us go straight to the burning question. As Heisenberg expressly 
recognized in Physik und Philosophie, the assertions of quantum mechanics do not re-
spect what we have called “OR”, i.e., they cannot be fully objectified and are, thus, in-
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compatible with what he calls “dogmatic realism”. Heisenberg certainly recognizes that 
every researcher aims at what is “objectively true”. But quantum mechanics goes so 
deep and so sharply into the minute structure of nature that the searching apparatus pro-
vokes uncontrolled changes in the very system it is intended to scrutinize. So we can 
make assertions not truly about what objectively is, but only about the results of the in-
teractions between measuring devices and physical system. In other words, it is as if all 
assertions of quantum mechanics were about an entirely new domain: not the quantum 
phenomena themselves, but the new global systems formed through the fusion between 
quantum entities and measuring devices (which have a quantum reality of their own). 
And these quantum mechanical assertions, now referring to this “in-between realm”, 
would not respect OR either, because the application of any other verification method 
should engage another measuring device creating another physical system in which, 
possibly, the former phenomena could no longer be detectable. 
For Heisenberg, this circumstance proves nothing against quantum theory as such 
(or, better, against the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum formalism). It proves only 
that natural science is possible without strong realist claims. Rejecting dogmatic realism 
(viz., All scientific assertions respect OR) and metaphysical realism (viz., Things studied 
by science exist absolutely), Heisenberg proposes a kind of “practical” realism (viz. 
Some scientific assertions respect OR) which amounts to a denial that natural science 
requires OR and to a confession that idealism or some kind of instrumentalism is an 
even better foundation. In fact, in light of Heisenberg’s considerations, we could say 
that these latter epistemic doctrines are preferable because they are, at least, more gen-
eral, given that only macroscopic phenomena can supposedly give rise to assertions re-
specting OR, and that idealism or instrumentalist versions of science could encompass 
assertions respecting OR as well as assertions not respecting it. 
Nevertheless, we must make a distinction. We can say that sometimes measuring 
devices disturb the physical systems in an essential way and that, some other times, the 
impact of measuring devices on the observed systems can be disregarded. The talk 
about “disturbance”, and about disturbances that can or cannot be ignored in experimen-
tal situations, is plainly consistent with OR. Inconsistency with OR arises when quan-
tum mechanics insists that the measuring device “creates” or “realizes” the properties of 
a system that was not in a determinate physical state before the measuring operations 
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were done. Heisenberg’s argument against OR requires talking about “creation” and not 
talking about simple “disturbance”. In fact, the realism implicated in OR is not put in 
question in case our measuring devices disturb or do not disturb the system to an appre-
ciable extent, but only in case the measuring devices bring about a kind of “passage” 
from potentiality to actuality. Indeed, we can always say that, if p is know, then p is the 
case simpliciter, with a slightly (or even a considerable) deviation due to disturbances 
originating in the very act of knowing (in its physical basis). It would be something dif-
ferent altogether to assert that there is no p before the very act of knowing pushes the 
physical system to a certain outcome, so that we could not talk about a state indepen-
dent of the verification method associated with it. So, the fact that measuring is itself a 
physical procedure that always disturbs the physical system measured (in a degree that 
can or cannot be ignored) says absolutely nothing against OR. 
On the other hand, it is common knowledge since Bohr’s essay of 1927 “The 
Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory” that quantum me-
chanics puts severe limitations on ORR, disallowing causal and space-time descriptions 
that could be simultaneously pursued with an arbitrary degree of precision (technically: 
they refer to observables of non-commuting operators). According to Bohr, the validity 
of the superposition principle and of the conservation laws entails the impossibility of a 
full causal and space-time description. This is so because, as Bohr himself puts it, in 
attempting to trace the laws of the time-spatial propagation according to the quantum 
postulate, we are confined to statistical conclusions in light of Schrödinger’s wave-
equation, and, on the other hand, the claim of causality for the individual processes, 
characterized by the quantum of action, forces us to renounce to this space-time des-
cription. 
In fact, for values under the lower limit of h/4pi for the product of the two meas-
uring uncertainties –the so called Heisenberg’s indeterminacy-relations– we can have 
one or the other, but not both descriptions at the same time. Heisenberg presented for 
the first time these indeterminacy-relations in 1927. In a Gedankenexperiment with a 
gamma-ray microscope, he reasoned first about the possibility of measuring simultane-
ously the position and momentum of an electron. Fixing the position of the electron 
with a total precision would imply an infinite indeterminacy in the electron’s momen-
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tum, and vice-versa. After that, he extended these indeterminacy-relations to the pair 
time-energy and found the same lower limit for the product of the two uncertainties. 
For a Heisenberg caught in the middle of a struggle with Schrödinger’s wave-me-
chanics, all that these indeterminacy-relations were showing us was no more than the 
essential discontinuity and unpredictability of the quantum world. He avoided any talk 
about real particles and (hélas!) real waves. However, Bohr had other views on the is-
sue, and a definite non-realistic, non-Schrödingean interpretation regarding the physical 
meaning of the wave-function. In harsh and relentless discussions with Heisenberg, he 
stressed that the very kernel of the indeterminacy-relations was the unavoidable wave-
particle duality of quantum phenomena and the complementarity-principle he was pro-
posing at the same time. Indeed, as it is generally recognized, with Bohr’s ingenious 
concept of complementarity we have reached the very heart not only of indeterminacy-
relations, but also of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a whole. 
Assessing the overall philosophical consequences of this principle, we could say 
that it tells us the following somewhat disappointing story: 
1. Quantum entities show us nothing by themselves. 
2. If proved by an apparatus, quantum entities can manifest wave-like behavior or parti-
cle-like behavior. 
3. The behaviors of quantum entities are always behaviors relative to and in the context of 
a definite apparatus. 
4. These particle-like and wave-like behaviors are not manifested simultaneously and by 
the interaction with the same apparatus. 
5. For that reason, the concepts of particle and wave do not contradict each other, given 
that they are not applied at the same time and in the same experimental context to the 
same quantum entity. 
6. Instead, they exclude each other, but are both jointly necessary to the description of the 
diversity of quantum manifestations. 
7. So, firstly, we have no grips on the quantum entities, but only the possibility of apply-
ing to them concepts we have borrowed previously from the macroscopic world of classi-
cal physics. 
8. Secondly –as it seems Bohr himself has put it– for us there is no such thing as a quan-
tum world, but only a quantum physical description. 
9. And, thirdly, quantum entities are a well founded, although limited, conjecture from the 
macroscopic (classical) world into the microscopic (non-classical) world which returns 
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back to some processes and phenomena in the macroscopic (classical) world (e.g., the 
classical concept of a particle gives rise to the quantum concept of an electron movement, 
which serves to interpret a trace of condensed water vapor in the ionization chamber). 
We see that complementarity puts severe limitations to ORR (and OR), concern-
ing not only the possibility of conjoining causal description and space-time coordina-
tion, but also regarding the very possibility of taking quantum phenomena as a realm of 
real entities, i.e., of taking them as appearances of an actual world of things and events. 
As a matter of fact, the quantum phenomenon, as described in Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s 
interpretations, lacks the conditions to be considered an entity in the full sense of the 
word: it has no independence from the measuring device, no integrated description of its 
own multiple manifestations, no concepts borrowed in its very nature, and no such fun-
damental things as continuity across space-time, determined actual states and separa-
tion. And so we face, with the Copenhagen interpretation, the following devastating si-
tuation for our hopes to understand nature: fundamental concepts are not realistically in-
terpretable – we must only say that we are constructing a science as if there were a 
quantum world consisting of waves, on the one hand, and particles, on the other hand, 
but knowing at the same time that we have no appropriate concepts to understand the 
way what we are describing as particles combines with what we are describing as waves 
in the same quantum entity. That is to say: the very concepts of physics we are using do 
not allow us to construct a sound and coherent representation of physis. 
All this pertains to the story and the problem of quantum mechanics and is well 
known to all. Let us only stress that the ensuing development in the Copenhagen paths 
since 1926-7 only accrues the perplexities. We have, as Jim Baggott points out in his 
book Beyond Measure: 
1. A non-classic interpretation of probability. Unlike Boltzmann’s probabilities, quan-
tum probabilities do not reflect our ignorance about the individual real processes of a 
complex system, but rather express the likelihood the interaction with a measuring 
device would then create a determined outcome as the actual state of a physical sys-
tem. Max Born proposed in a paper published in 1926 the probabilistic interpretation 
of Schrödinger’s wave-function. According to him, the square of the amplitude of the 
wave-function in same region of configuration space is related to the probability of 
finding the quantum particle in that region. So the wave-function does not depict a 
quantum entity, but only our knowledge about the probability of certain outcomes. 
 20 
The descriptions made by quantum probabilities relate to many experiences. Project-
ing them onto an individual system entails that the individual system will be a super-
position of all its possible actual states. In fact, quantum mechanics stresses that whe-
never a quantum system can be in a plurality of states, the superposition of states is it-
self a state in which the system is until some measures are made on it. 
2. An appeal to consciousness in the passage from potentiality to actuality. The mathe-
matical framework of quantum mechanics does not describe the passage from poten-
tiality to actuality. The collapse of the wave-function is simply supposed to occur, so 
that the system can pass from the superposition of all its possible states to an actual 
definite state. Facing the infinite regress implied in the fact that the measuring appa-
ratus is itself a quantum entity, entering in a superposition with the physical system 
under observation, von Neumann introduced his famous thesis that the wave-function 
collapses when and if the system interacts with consciousness. In fact, even the sense 
organs and the brain are quantum systems entering in a new composite wave-func-
tion. Only consciousness is supposed to be a reality beyond the physical realm that 
puts an end to the infinite regress. 
3. Entangled states and non-locality. Two particles that have interacted are described by 
a single two-particle state vector. When a measure is made on one of them, the state 
vector collapses into a definite state, forcing the other particle to realize instantane-
ously a specific correlated state, no matter how far it will be from the former (it can 
be on “the other side” of the Universe). Bohr began to give up the talk about “distur-
bance” introduced by measuring operations in his rejoinder to the EPR argument in 
October 1935. Since then, he defended an indeterminacy of the system before its rela-
tionship to an apparatus that is tantamount to a real action at a distance in the case of 
entangled particles. This was a direct vindication of non-locality. The particles lost 
their individuality in space-time. After him, Bell’s inequality theorem and experi-
ments promoted by Aspect and Wheeler gave experimental, but very controversial 
support to the reality of entanglement.  
Must we give up OR and ORR together, that is, must we give up onto-gnosiologi-
cal realism and the general way we used to do science? Must we alter the very concept 
of scientific knowledge? Is this a reasonable price to pay: entanglement, that is: non-lo-
cality; ad hoc consciousness, that is: the determination of the physical world relying on 
a non-physical entity; superposition, that is: the bare actuality of potentiality; and com-
plementarity, that is: renunciation even to a not full-fledged realistic description of a 
quantum world? 
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To finish with this point, let us only say, thirdly, that this is not such a desperate 
situation. There have been winds of change blowing since 1926-7. Facing the puzzling 
aspects of quantum wave-like and particle-like manifestations, the French physicist 
Louis de Broglie proposed a description of the inner structure of quantum entities that 
turned these disparate manifestations into phenomena of a well defined underlying 
quantum reality. Against Born’s interpretation, de Broglie proposed in 1926 to view 
quantum entities as singularities (point-like particles) moving in a real field, while, at 
the same time, there was a second field which had the statistical and probabilistic sig-
nificance of Schrödinger’s wave-function, as interpreted by Born and Bohr. After this 
first proposal, de Broglie simplified his theory about the inner structure of a quantum 
entity. It was, now, a point-particle moving in a continuous, real wave-field. The parti-
cle follows the wave-field, and its position is more likely to be in those regions where 
the amplitude of the wave-field is larger. This is precisely “la loi du guidage”, as de 
Broglie himself put it: the particle in not only directed by the wave-field, the particle is 
nothing more than a singularity of the wave itself. Thus, contrasting with Bohr’s rather 
mysterious talk about complementarity, we have no duality between waves and particles 
and no permanent necessity of speaking the language of waves or the language of parti-
cles, never knowing how something can reveal both particle-like behavior and wave-
like behavior. On the contrary, we have now an insight into the deep structure of a 
quantum entity that is able to turn such disparate manifestations into well defined and 
predictable phenomena of one and the same entity. The interpretation of the double-slit 
experiment is now trivial: the singularity passes through one and only one slit, while the 
real wave passes through both slits and produces constructive and destructive interfer-
ences determining the path of the singularity. No need to say that, contrary to Copenha-
gen interpretation, every particle has in its field a definite position and a definite mo-
mentum. Probabilities revert now to their classical significance: they express only our 
ignorance about the intricacies of the quantum world. This theory by de Broglie was 
developed by Bohm a few decades later. He introduced a non-classical quantum poten-
tial, U, to explain the motion of particles. When this quantum potential decreases to 
zero, the equations of motion of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation revert to the classi-
cal equations of Newtonian mechanics in the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi formalism. Re-
cently, Croca and his associates proposed a reappraisal of the de Broglie’s theory, as it 
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will be profusely explained in this book. Taking de Broglie’s realistic approach, Croca 
distinguished between the real-wave, now called theta-wave, and the point-like singu-
larity within the wave, called acron, that is, the higher energetic region of the whole 
structure. 
As we can see, the clash between Born’s and Bohr’s interpretation, on the one 
hand, and de Broglie-Bohm-Croca’s interpretation, on the other hand, is not a simple 
disagreement at the level of explicative concepts. On the contrary, referring to our HR 
above, we must say that there is a real conflict at the level of constitutive concepts. We 
must, then, expect that a new realm of phenomena and new facts will be uncovered by 
the challenging theory. As a matter of fact, the initial approach by de Broglie predicts 
superluminal velocities for the singularity; recently, in 1993, Peter Holland emphasized 
in his book The Quantum Theory of Motion that de Broglie-Bohm theory had something 
different to say about the time taken by particles to tunnel through a potential barrier. 
Recent work by Croca about tunneling shows some different results too, and, more im-
portantly, some new phenomena at the sub-quantum level (concerning theta-waves) are 
coming near to being discovered and converted into new facts of the quantum world. 
In a word, de Broglie-Bohm-Croca’s realistic interpretation of the wave and of the 
singularity (Crocas’s acron) as a point-like region in the real wave bypasses the conun-
drums and conceptual perplexities of the Copenhagen interpretation: there is no quan-
tum jumps, no collapse of the wave-function, no mysterious contribution of conscious-
ness to measuring operations, and probabilities return to their classical meaning. In ad-
dition, it seems that the realistic interpretation is also able to point in the direction of 
new realms of phenomena (at the sub-quantum level) and to constitute entirely new 
facts. Only the subsequent experimental and conceptual work can show what the final 
decision will be.  
 
 
3. Underpinning onto-gnosiological realism: knowledge and its entities 
 
Meanwhile, we need to come to a decision about the following double way of con-
sidering the general issue of quantum mechanics: is quantum mechanics really present-
ing us new and utterly insoluble paradoxes about knowledge and about nature (as the 
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Copenhagen interpretation suggests), or is quantum mechanics just destroying some 
naïve conceptions we had, as to give rise to a new coherent conception about knowledge 
and its object (as a debroglian realistic interpretation would maintain)? The answer is 
somewhere in between these two extremes. Quantum mechanics showed that classical 
ideas about nature and knowledge were inapplicable to it – this is undeniable. However, 
we have reasons to question whether the paradoxical look of quantum mechanics is an 
ultimate and insuperable situation (and if so, in what regards), or whether these para-
doxes can be overturned in a new post-classical conception that is still to come. In addi-
tion, we must remark that, on the one hand, quantum mechanics corrected some over-
simplifications about knowledge and its object, and these very corrections have dimin-
ished, in turn, the weight of quantum paradoxes; on the other hand, some paradoxes of 
quantum mechanics are still based on the entrenched naïve ideas, and it is foreseeable 
that the criticism of those ingenuities will contribute to dissolve them. 
Up until now, a huge literature emphasized the paradoxes: entanglement, measur-
ing acts collapsing the wave-functions, wave-particle duality, a general lack of strong 
objectivity and the rise of a nondeterministic, somewhat irrational description of nature. 
Let us now stress, the other way around, both the naïve conceptions we used to be ac-
quainted with and which quantum mechanics have begun to beat down, and those naïve 
conceptions quantum mechanics still accepts without a doubt. 
Given their special character, we will call them “fictions”. The word is used here 
not as meaning something non-real or patently false, but in the following precise sense: 
a fiction is some assumption not justified in itself that allows us to think as if some 
things really were true, so that we embed phenomena in a particular conceptual frame-
work and give them a correlated meaning. Fictions are in most cases simplifications and 
highly abstract hypothesis that dispense us to inquire into the true nature of reality. They 
are not a theory and they are not constitutive concepts either, they are, rather, a useful 
device to deal with complex realities in the absence of a true knowledge or a sound the-
ory about its nature. For instance, the liberty and responsibility of people brought to 
justice is an overall fiction that allows the adjudication of guilt or innocence in a trial: 
the jury decides as if the defendant were really free and really responsible of all the cri-
minal acts he is accused of. However, the full liberty and responsibility of individuals in 
society are assumptions never proved by anybody. Political theory also furnishes us 
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with a lot of fictions. The idea that the commonwealth began by means of a mutual pact 
between individuals, so that this social contract and not brute force counts as the very 
beginning of the state, is an evident fiction developed by some political thinkers like 
Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. This fiction allowed them to consider political society 
as if all individuals were free and equal from the start, and to justify political obligation 
before the sovereign as if it had sprung from an original act of consent (the original 
pact). 
We cannot take a simple pragmatic approach to fictions. The question is not sim-
ply whether they are useful, but also whether they are true or, at least, plausible as-
sumptions. We cannot have an understanding of reality fully based on fictions. They 
must retreat in face of an effective knowledge of what there is. The fiction about the 
liberty of individuals is a good approximation to truth, if we disregard the metaphysical 
question of free-will and define liberty in terms of voluntary acts. Besides, in order to 
prevent social disorder it is useful to have a penal system, and penal systems are based 
on criminal law, which depends on the idea of imputability, that is, of the liberty and re-
sponsibility of individuals. The fiction of the original contract is, however, entirely im-
plausible nowadays, and this implausibility hinders all utility it may have had in the 
past: nobody believes it now and nobody acts in accordance with it, that is to say, as if it 
were true. 
Classical gnosiological thinking was also prolific in fictions. Let us examine those 
that are most important for our issue. 
1. The immaterial eye fiction, that is, knowledge mostly conceived as a simple action of 
taking notice of what is, i. e., as a (theoretical) regard that does not affect or alter the 
things looked upon. Vision was paradigmatic for this fiction about knowledge. And 
theory, conceptual thinking in general, was often conceived as an intellectual vision 
too – as an “intuitus mentis”, as Descartes named it. The ancient idioms theorein and 
contemplare had the same idea behind them in the ancient noetic parlance. According 
to this fiction, all happens as if things were what they are and, then, a supervening re-
gard only came to register their existence and properties. Naïve realism uses this fic-
tion surreptitiously in order to talk about a reality that is what it is independently of 
being known or not. For neutralizing the impact of knowledge on reality, this fiction 
suggests that knowledge is an event belonging to a mind that forms no part of the 
physical-material universe and does not produce any effects on it. Linked with this 
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fiction there is, thus, a sketchy dualism between matter and mind. Not so surprisingly, 
von Neumann’s conception about the role of consciousness in measurement only 
radicalizes this fiction of the immaterial eye: instead of merely taking notice of what 
things already are we now have the idea of a non-material, non-physical regard that 
makes things happen and be what they are. However, this fiction about an action of 
taking notice that has no roots and no effects in the reality concerned is completely 
untenable. Quantum mechanics, without Copenhagen thesis about the creative power 
of measuring acts, suggested the idea of an inevitable (even if depreciable) distur-
bance of physical systems by the very act of knowing, which is an obvious state of af-
fairs when the act of knowing is not a pure theoretical inspection, but an experimental 
operation involving technical apparatus (but even macroscopic vision is, after all, a 
physical event that disturbs infinitesimally the surrounding world). Thus, contrary to 
this fiction, we must considerer, from the very start, the act of knowing as a physical 
action which produces modifications in the things that are its objects, so that knowl-
edge never reaches a nude reality, undisturbed by the very act of knowing. We can 
say as a motto: every act of knowing a physical universe is itself a physical event in 
the universe. 
2. The certain-inside versus the uncertain-outside fiction, that is, the idea that knowl-
edge is an event taking place in the internal arena of consciousness, in a “theatrum 
mentis” (inner stage), so to speak, so that reality is conceived as a realm of “exteriori-
ty” unattainable by a direct grasping. This is one of the most widespread fictions in 
gnosiological thinking. Descartes inaugurated a doubt about the existence of an exter-
nal world based on the assumption that the mind has direct access only to its own 
ideas. If the mind is closed in upon itself, reality becomes a matter of “exteriority”, 
while the mind moves back to an extra-worldly “internal” space. This gives a sem-
blance of plausibility to the extremely odd idea that there is a split between a material, 
external universe, and an immaterial, internal mind. From now on, under the impres-
sive suggestion of this fiction, the events in the internal stage of the mind are consid-
ered as certain and beyond all conceivable doubt, while things in the external universe 
–to which the internal events allegedly refer– are uncertain and doubtful. Male-
branche, Berkeley, David Hume – all of them were cases of this inner-outer, certain-
uncertain fiction. Kant tried to amend this in his famous “Refutation of Idealism” in 
the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. His point was that the inner sense is possible only 
through the mediation of the outer sense (the intuition of time depending on the intui-
tion of something permanent in space), so that the certainty of the outer sense is equal 
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to the certainty of the inner sense. Nevertheless, Kant’s argument is pointing only 
halfway beyond this fiction, because he continues to accept the very distinction and a 
definition of physical reality in terms of exteriority relative to the mind. One of the 
most conspicuous consequences of this fiction was the Humean thesis that, when the 
mind is affected by some external objects, the only things that are given to it are its 
own internal modifications, called “impressions”, so that the mind does not have a 
solid ground to state, for instance, “The thing perceived is hot”, but only to say 
“There is now a sensation of hotness in me”. This is tantamount to saying that any 
measuring apparatus, a thermometer, say, can only report its own internal states and 
not causally refer these states to an objective reality. As a matter of fact, if, according 
to this fiction, this reference takes the form of a mapping of the internal states onto an 
external universe, the skeptic will always raise doubts as to whether there is truly an 
external reality outside” the mind to which these internal states refer. When quantum 
mechanics considers the measuring apparatus as the only thing whose states physics 
can describe, it suffers somewhat from the same Humean delusion. Against it, we 
must state that any sensible organism interprets its states as a result of the intercon-
nection between itself and the surrounding world. These states do not represent 
something external – they do not “depict” an external reality. We must drop this way 
of considering things. Those states are states of reality, not of an “inside” (the mind) 
referred to an “outside” (the “external” world). This reality is not bare reality (a 
deeper consideration shows that this concept of “bare reality” is meaningless), but re-
ality submitted to the set of operations that we call “interaction with the measuring 
apparatus” or “interaction with a living organism.” So we must say: an apparatus (or a 
sense organ – vision, say) is not a device to scan a reality external to it, but a procedu-
re to induce a certain kind of events in reality. For instance, the complex system eye-
brain-consciousness is a device to bring about a chromatic world. “Outside” this sys-
tem there is no chromatic world at all, i.e., in order to have a chromatic world we 
must insert in reality the set of operations produced by the system eye-optical nerves-
brain-consciousness (by itself, the reality from which we are starting is not “nude rea-
lity”, but already the result of other sets of interconnected and stratified operations). 
Thus Bohr’s hunch was half-right after all. In a way, the measuring apparatus pushes 
the physical system to a certain outcome that was not there before. The apparatus (or 
our sensibility) is not a way to figure out an outside, “external” reality – it is part of 
the same reality, and a more complex level of reality, bringing about phenomena that 
constitute new realms in their own right. Bohr’s general conception about the nature 
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of an apparatus (or the sense organ of a living organism) is then quite right when sta-
ting, as in the essay of 1935 “Quantum Mechanics and Physical Reality,” that the pro-
cedure of measurement has an essential influence on the conditions on which the defi-
nition of the physical quantities rests. The fault of Bohr’s conception lies in his re-
fusal to account for the dependence of physical properties upon the experimental ap-
paratus in terms of causal processes producing growing levels of complexity. 
3. The fiction of the label-like properties of objects, that is, the idea that objects by them-
selves have individualizing, well-defined properties before any interaction takes place 
between them. Notwithstanding the seemingly strong evidence supporting this idea, it 
is a naïve way of thinking about reality. A property is not like a label that a thing has 
in order to be distinguished from any other thing. Things do not have properties – 
things acquire properties as long as they interact with each other. Every property ex-
presses an interaction. For instance, speaking about the polarization of light or the 
spin of an electron, which are intrinsic properties, is a way of expressing some pat-
terns of interactions of light or electrons with some other physical entities (like a filter 
or a magnetic field). Quantum mechanics contributed powerfully to a break down of 
this old naiveté of ontological and gnosiological thinking. As a matter of fact, the best 
examples to illustrate this are given by quantum entities, because they cannot be de-
scribed as macroscopic objects that are the apparently enduring bearers of permanent 
properties. Nevertheless, in other realms, the same general conception applies. Talk-
ing about the sincerity or the generosity of a person means that some behavior usually 
took place when this person was submitted to a specific social situation (say, being 
always veracious in the expression of his own feelings, giving assistance to others, 
and so on). It makes no sense to talk about the properties of being sincere or generous 
of a person that does not have social interactions with other people. The fiction of a 
label-like property of objects gave rise to an ontology that conceded a primary rank to 
the concept of “thing”. In accordance with this fiction, ultimately we could even 
speak of a universe composed of just one thing which had, say, properties a, b and c 
instead of properties d, f or g, even if this way of putting things amounts to an obvious 
non-sense. In this respect, metaphysics has for a longtime discussed the “principium 
individuationis,” i.e., the conditions that allow a thing to be one and, at the same time, 
distinct from any other. A multitude of answers was given to this secular problem, 
from Aristotle and Aquinas to Leibniz and Kant. The Leibnizian way of dealing with 
the problem was a very interesting one. It consisted in putting the principle of indivi-
duation not in a space-time location but instead into form, that is, by way of determi-
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nation, and in considering that the individuality of a thing is given by an infinite series 
of predicates, describing all its real properties (the word “real” meaning, in the scho-
lastic jargon Leibniz was using here, a property that is inherent to the thing itself and 
that is not a relation to another thing, i.e., something expressed by a monadic and not 
by an n-adic predicate). However, so far, so… bad, we could say, because this is the 
same as thinking candidly that we can answer the ontological question about what 
there is by simply stating that there are a plurality of substances (i.e., bearers or sub-
jects of a collection of real predicates), and that substances differ from others in hav-
ing some label-like properties peculiar to them or a set of properties that is not repli-
cated by any other thing. Notwithstanding this naiveté, when we wonder why the in-
finite set of properties of one substance cannot be replicated by another thing, we 
come to an interesting answer: Leibniz suggests that every property of one thing is 
necessarily correlated with a correspondent property of any other thing, so that, if two 
sets of properties were not correlated but wholly identical, they will constitute the 
very same substance, expressing the universe from the same point of view. That is to 
say: it is true that, for Leibniz, substances are series of real predicates and are closed 
in upon themselves, according to the label-like fiction; nevertheless, each real predi-
cate of one substance is necessarily in correlation with at least one property of any 
other existing substance. This is tantamount to saying that properties express univer-
sal interconnections of one substance with all substances in the universe. Going be-
yond Leibniz’s metaphysics, we could say that properties are just the expression of 
causal interconnections, something like the result of an interaction between all physi-
cal realities. In a word: a property is not a state a thing simply has from the start, but a 
state a being acquires as a result of an interaction. And if we can say with Leibniz that 
a substance is an infinite set of properties, this will mean now that a substance is an 
infinite process of interaction with other things. Thus we must take determination or 
property not as a label, but always as an interaction result. The fiction of things as 
bearers of properties is overturned: a “thing” is now just a never-ending process of 
causal interactions in which it gets determination. Spinoza said once omnis determi-
natio est negatio. Adjusting a bit Spinoza’s dictum, we could put it as motto: omnis 
determinatio est interactio. 
In putting these things together, we must say: (i) physical knowledge is itself a 
physical disturbing process involving measuring apparatus (the same applies to the 
sense organs of our perceptual acquaintance with the surrounding world); (ii) a mea-
suring apparatus is a physical way for producing phenomena of a special kind; and (iii) 
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properties of physical systems are the results of interaction between these very systems 
and other physical systems (namely, but not forcibly, an apparatus). This is our non-
classical version of onto-gnosiological realism: not a word about a reality that is what it 
is regardless of being known or not; also not a word about a conception of knowledge as 
a non-disturbing process; and, finally, a place for the observer, and for a physics closely 
related to the observer’s point of view in a universe that goes beyond the observational 
content (linked to the measuring apparatuses or just to the sense organs) by means of a 
causal connection between this content and the underlying reality. Keeping this in mind, 
we will not only see the limits of classical gnosiological theories, but we will also have 
some glimpses into what is solid and what is doubtful in the paradoxes quantum me-
chanics presents to us. 
As a matter of fact, if we examine the major attempt to give an epistemological 
foundation to classical Newtonian mechanics, that is, if we turn our eyes to the Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft, by Immanuel Kant, we will see that the operations involved in 
knowledge are described as follows: 
I. Univocal location of any event in space and time. i.e., space-time coordination; 
II. Causal connection of any event with any other event simultaneous to it (reciprocal ac-
tion) or situated in the future (causality in a narrow sense), i.e., settlement of an uni-
versal causal net; 
To those operations of coordination and causation the following conditions apply: 
A.  Definition of an object in terms of continuity of events across space-time; 
B. The principle of conservation (of “matter”, or better yet, of “energy”) as a necessary 
condition for the passage of an object from one position to other (contiguous) position 
in space-time and from one state to another; 
C. The principle of determination of any state of an object by (i) its previous states (if it 
is a closed system), plus (ii) the causal interaction with all other objects (if not a clo-
sed system); 
D. The principle of complete determination of an object regarding all its possible proper-
ties. 
Kant (and Newton too) thought that I. was a simple matter of Euclidian geometry, 
plus the reference to a universal time order. It is well known that the special theory of 
relativity brought major complications to this very simple idea. An univocal location of 
events and determination of distance between pairs of events turned out not to be mea-
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suring the distances in space and time relative to a given frame of reference, but deter-
mining a new magnitude, invariant to all possible observers, named “space-time inter-
val.” However, the great correction relativity introduced relates to II. – the quest for a 
maximal velocity of signal transmission destroyed the (supposedly) Newtonian idea of 
an instantaneous action at a distance –as far as gravity is concerned– and the Kantian 
assumption that there is a causal web connecting simultaneously all objects in empirical 
space. 
Nevertheless, it was quantum mechanics that introduced a real rupture into this 
classical scheme. And so, we come, at last, to the paradoxes. To begin with, the possi-
bility of performing conjointly coordination operations and causal connections to an 
arbitrary degree of precision was severely restricted by the complementarity principle; 
as we saw above, either we have position (doing coordination operations) or we have 
momentum (developing causal reasoning). Moreover, the quantum entity – as the Co-
penhagen interpretation stresses– is by itself not determined in its position and momen-
tum under a certain lower limit, which turns out to be the Heisenberg’s indeterminacy 
relations. Epistemological uncertainty (Heisenberg’s Ungewissheit) is based on onto-
logical (physical) indeterminacy (Heisenberg’s word was precisely Unbestimmtheit). 
This directly rebuffs D. In addition, quantum mechanics also shakes A, C, and D anew 
with its quantum jumps, the restriction to probabilities, and the superposition of linear 
states before the interaction with an apparatus produces a determinate state through the 
collapse of the wave-function. The only principle still unshaken is B, if we interpret it as 
an energy conservation law (Bohr himself pondered several times if he had to drop it). 
In turn, the non-locality of entangled states is a fresh departure from the constraints 
raised by relativity and a return to a Newtonian conception of something like an action 
at a distance connecting all things in the universe. 
What does a neo-debroglian approach mixed with our onto-gnosiological realism 
have to say about all this? That was the question. To begin with, let us say that quantum 
entities are certainly not like classical, macroscopic objects. This circumstance imposes 
some qualifications onto A and C: first, it is a matter of discussion if we do not have 
something like acron jumps inside the finite theta-wave (if we consider that the real 
theta-wave, despite its extension, is all contained in each time-point, say tn, the subse-
quent position of the acron in tn+1 can be any point on the theta-wave in tn+1 even if not 
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contiguous to the point it had in tn – tunneling could be an effect directly related to this, 
with the acron “jumping” to the region of the theta-wave that stands behind the barrier); 
second, the displacement of the acron along the theta-wave is nondeterministic – it inte-
grates stochastic process and gives rise only to a probabilistic description. However, 
despite this non-classical view, we can reach a rather different general explanation for 
the reason why we cannot simultaneously hold coordination and causal determinations 
to an arbitrary level of precision. In fact, considering what we said above, we must pon-
der freezing all talk about complementarity and try to substitute for it the concept of 
pairs of mutually-dependent properties. We can define this concept as follows: proper-
ties A and B are a pair of mutually-dependent properties if any alteration in one of them 
disturbs the other, so that we cannot go from the determination of a precise value of A to 
a precise value of B and return from B to the same value of A, and vice-versa, because 
the alteration of one quantity produces an alteration in the other quantity in a probabil-
istic, nondeterministic way. Now we could say: given that a quantum entity has at each 
moment a set of interactions with other quantum entities from which it gets some pre-
cise properties defining its state, and given that some interactions interfere with other 
mutually-dependent properties, disturbing the values they have (position and momen-
tum, for instance), a quantum entity must be considered as a balance always in adjust-
ment between the properties it has (from previous interactions), the new properties it 
gets (from actual interactions), and the disturbing processes that impinge chains of al-
teration-loops in the mutually-dependent properties. That is: a quantum entity is actually 
determined in all properties it has, it has definite position and definite velocity, even if it 
is in a never-ending process of alteration-loops between its mutually-dependent proper-
ties (this is the same as stating that we cannot have simultaneously a precise measuring-
value for them all). Thus a quantum entity, if not closed upon itself but submitted to 
some measuring process, is never stabilized in a well-defined global state. 
To conclude, we must state that our approach must reject the classical principle of 
complete determination. Kant said that it is not a condition for the possibility of expe-
rience, but only a rational rule for conceiving what a thing is, tracing for it a place in the 
sum of all possibilities. As he puts it in his Kritik (B599-600), “Every thing, as regards 
its possibility, is … subject to the principle of complete determination, according to 
which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their contradictory 
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opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it.” That is to 
say: to conceive the possibility of a thing is to put it (better: to conceive the possibility 
of such a procedure) before all pairs of possible predicates and to decide for each one of 
the pair, so that a thing is conceived as real when it is (or is taken as) completely deter-
mined by all conceivable predicates. Two things are different if and only if they have 
different global series of predicates. We approach Leibniz. And, if we enter the realm of 
physical knowledge with this principle in hand, we come to the idea that any physical 
object must be in causal interconnection with all objects in the universe. As a matter of 
fact, comparing one thing to all possible predicates turns now into a process of putting a 
thing in connection with all other existing things. So we must embrace the idea that 
there is a universal causal web linking each thing with all other things, so that the full 
knowledge of one simple physical being would imply the knowledge of the physical 
universe as a whole. We would come near Laplace’s demon, which dwells in a full de-
terministic universe, where everything is connected to everything. However, if we do 
not drop the relativistic idea of a maximal finite velocity for signal transmission and 
causal connection (no matter if it is c or otherwise), given that a property is an interac-
tion, as we said, and that an object has no interaction with all other objects (relativity’s 
must), we cannot define a real object as something which is completely determined re-
garding all is possible predicates, because a physical object never is in causal connec-
tion with all physical objects and so necessarily lacks the (possible) properties related to 
those interactions: in this regard, it is patently undetermined, and it is just as partially 
undetermined or as incompletely determined that we must affirm its very existence. 
 
 
4. Physis – what is it? 
 
Here is the question that turns all of us into no more than apprentices. We will try 
to get some glimpses beyond the customary paths, even if by taking the risk of being a 
bit speculative. 
For a long time, natural philosophy fit comfortably within the Cartesian split be-
tween matter and mind. Descartes thought that the former, pre-Galilean way of con-
ceiving the physical realm suffered from a huge misconception, namely, the blend of 
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properties pertaining to mind and to matter, as if they formed a whole. In his criticism 
of scholastic and Aristotelian physics and biology, concepts like “sensitive soul”, 
“vegetative soul” or “substantial form” were denounced as a kind of anthropomorphic 
projection into the material realm of concepts belonging only to mind. Specifically, the 
scholastic physics, following Aristotelian principles, made a massive use of the concept 
of form, which, from Descartes’ point of view, could only be understandable through 
the erroneous import of properties that pertain exclusively to mind and, for that very 
reason, eventually veiled the properties that truly belong to matter. 
For the sake of a critical assessment, it would be important to distinguish Descar-
tes’ explicit argument from what is Descartes’ ultimate point. The argument starts in 
metaphysics. It begins with Descartes’ double thesis that his mind is better known (to 
him) than his body (or any other “outer” body) and –this is crucial– that he himself 
knows undoubtedly that he has a mind while it is doubtful whether he has a body linked 
to his own mind. Long after this initial split between certain self-knowledge as “mens” 
and doubtful self-knowledge as “corpus”, Descartes makes an additional appeal in his 
Meditations to the “veracitas dei” in order to settle that what is clearly and distinctly 
conceived of one thing belongs certainly to it, and that – following from the former the-
sis– if one thing can be conceived without the other (i.e., without the properties that are 
clearly and distinctly conceived in the other), then this very thing is separated from the 
other, or exists apart from it. The conclusion was, at this point, looming very near: con-
sidering that mind and body could be conceived apart, mind and body also could exist 
apart, so that the science of bodies and the science of minds do not conflate. 
The argument is flawed in several regards. The appeal to the veracitas dei proves 
nothing, because the certainty about the existence of God depends circularly on the clear 
and distinct rule; in addition, it is by no means sure that we can even conceive a mind 
without the understructure of a body and, conversely, a body without the organization 
superimposed by a “mind”, as the argument settles as premises (nothing that belongs to 
mind belongs to body, and nothing that belongs to body belongs to mind, states Descar-
tes). This double assumption that we can understand what a body is without some prop-
erties supposedly belonging to mind (more about this later), and, the other way around, 
that we can have a full concept of the mind (as a “substance”) without the properties 
belonging to body, this pair of assumptions are precisely Descartes’ point. He never 
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really demonstrated them; he simply took them as true premises for his overall argu-
ment (and as the faith underlying his entire work as physicist, embryologist, biologist, 
and so on). 
But what is mind? And body? What consequences follow concerning physics? Let 
us see more closely what Descartes’ point really was. It was a very bold bet: nothing 
less than suppressing systematically in the description of nature the reference to patterns 
of organization –which were entrenched in the concept of “form”– in order to come to 
them as results of the mechanistic, blind and not finalistic local motion of matter alone. 
That is to say: while Aristotelian-scholastic physics was going top-down, from the orga-
nization-pattern, called “form”, to the material base in which it was stamped, going 
down successively until the ultimate “undetermined matter”, the so-called substratum, 
was reached, Descartes’ bet was to go bottom-up, starting with autonomous laws of 
matter in order to arrive at the organized structures not as principles, but as results of 
these core-laws. Given that the reference to “form” (i.e., to organization patterns) was 
removed from the front door in the study of nature, physical substances were reduced to 
matter, and matter to motion.  The laws of matter were, now, simple laws of impact and 
communication of movement. Physicist had to discuss the relation between such scalar 
and vectorial quantities as force, movement, velocity, acceleration, mass, and so on. 
Regarding the organized top-structures, like living beings (or even crystals), the old na-
mes “substantial form” and “soul” were, thus, no longer applicable; considering that 
they were explainable in terms of the local motions and arrangements of their own con-
stitutive parts, their new and true name was instead (natural) “machines”. 
Surely, the old concept of “form” was poorly illuminating. It explained really no-
thing. Notwithstanding, it had several advantages in the understanding of nature. Name-
ly, it directed the attention from the very start to patterns of organization, and not simply 
to bits of bare mass (the “quantitas materiae”), and, in addition to this richer point of 
view, it endorsed a broader concept of movement, which encompassed not only local 
displacement, but also the phenomena of growing and alteration, which were character-
istics of structured and organized beings. The Cartesian “reform” of physics was, then, 
based on several very hard although controversial assumptions. First, that bare matter 
could be considered by itself as a realm of local motion and forces acting by impact, 
that is, that kinematics and dynamics were the very core of physics; second, that organ-
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ized natural structures could be explained mechanically, without the involvement of 
teleological principles and final causes; third, that every time we were talking about so-
mething like a “plan”, an “organizing principle” or an “intention”, we would be talking 
about mind, i.e., about a psychic being, and definitively not about matter. 
So it was with Descartes. What we gained by this tour de force is well known to 
all. No need to describe it again. Modern natural philosophy took physics as the funda-
mental science, and physics was defined as the science of local motion until Faraday 
and Maxwell’s works in the 19th century about electromagnetism introduced a new 
branch. In line with this leading old idea, in the late 18th century Kant tried to present 
nothing less than an a priori deduction of the object of physics. In his First Metaphysi-
cal Principles of the Science of Nature, he presented physics as the science of matter, 
and the science of matter as the science of motion, to conclude, supposedly still in an a 
priori fashion, that the several parts of the science of matter in motion were Phoronomy 
(Kinematics), Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology (in a very particular sense). 
But Kant himself realized at the same time the limits of mechanistic explanatory 
schemes. Let us return briefly to Descartes’ theoretical decisions. They were certainly a 
tremendous step forward. But they were also a dramatic impoverishment. First of all, 
there are natural processes that seem to be driven by something like a plan, or a pattern, 
that determines in advance the disposition and the arrangement of the parts. Living or-
ganisms are such a case. But also global arrangements like the ones we can see in crys-
tals or in snow and ice patterns suggest to the natural philosopher that there is some-
thing like a “natural technique” or a “natural plan”, that is, something like an uncons-
cious natural intention (or propensity) in several physical processes. However, the very 
center of this insight into the deep structure of matter lies in organization as such, not in 
finalistic or intentional processes. Final causes or the talk about a “natural technique” or 
a “natural intention” are a rather bewildering response to the problem of organization, 
i.e., to organization as a phenomenon of nature in need of a natural explanation. We can 
see now what happened: Descartes’ reform suppressed from the science of nature any 
talk about final causes or intentions acting in natural phenomena, and, in so doing, the 
fact of organization, to which the concepts of final causes and forms used to apply, va-
nished from the regard of the natural philosopher. Refusing a bad answer to the problem 
of natural organization patterns (substantial forms, final causes, and so on), Descartes 
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imposed to drop the very fact of organization or, better, the concepts that constitute or-
ganization as a fact. This is precisely the first impoverishment we wanted to emphasize: 
organization was formerly picked-up in nature through the concepts of forms, inner in-
tentions, ends and plans; all those concepts were now interpreted through the model of 
the purposive action of a conscious mind and, for that very reason, they were excluded 
from the science of matter; as a result, organization was regarded only as a secondary 
upper-level phenomenon of something more fundamental, namely, as a consequence of 
the pure and simple local motion of matter. Now we can see the second dramatic impo-
verishment Descartes’ reform brought with it. Organization is a high-level phenomenon 
that is not explainable by a linear reasoning going from the parts to the whole and con-
sidering the whole as the simple sum of the parts. Organization is a pattern that emerges 
on an underlying multiplicity of elements, but in such a way that it seems that it was the 
pattern that directed in advance the disposition and arrangement of these elements. This 
was the “intentional” or “teleological” delusion to which the concepts of substantial 
form and final causes gave expression. Even Kant recognizes that organized structures, 
such as living beings, exhibit a complexity that lead to think as if the whole was not the 
result of the parts, but, contrariwise, as if it was the whole that commanded in advance 
the disposition of the parts. Kant considers, thus, that organized beings put an unbrea-
kable limit to mechanistic explanation. Nevertheless, his proposal that we must reflect 
as if there was a “natural wisdom” and a “natural technique” (another fiction: the teleo-
logical fiction, here somewhat lessened by Kant’s famous distinction between deter-
mining and reflective judgments) suffers from the old fault of considering that teleo-
logical concepts are the best (or even the sole) answer to the phenomenon of organiza-
tion. As Kant saw it, organization puts before us an epistemological problem: we do not 
see how organization can be thinkable as a natural phenomenon (without teleological 
concepts). In refusing teleology –even if it simply refers to the unconscious patterns en-
closed in the concept of a natural form– by assimilating all forms of design to the pur-
posive action of conscious minds and in refusing, obviously, to talk about properties of 
minds in the science of nature, Descartes’ reform closed at the same time all other paths 
to the organization phenomenon, so that the only intellectual scheme able to explain the 
top-properties of an organized natural structure was to try to recover them as an effect 
of the blind arrangement of the parts, as if they happened by pure chance.  
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Now the question is: how can we constitute the phenomenon of organization as a 
natural fact? We must give-up, obviously, the bold and straightforward teleological 
concepts. We can no longer think as if the whole preceded and directed in advance the 
arrangement of the parts. Instead, in order to take organization as a strict natural pheno-
menon, we must consider organization as a self-organization process. 
For doing this, the following constitutive concepts are worth being considered:  
Knotting – i.e., a tendency to join on the basis of some common or matching feature, like, 
for instance, frequency, energy level, opposite charge, or pairs of opposite spins, etc.: the enti-
ties resulting from knots can be “homeomeric” (the parts add to produce only one entity of the 
same nature, like the superposition of waves in phase), or “heteromeric” (the parts join to pro-
duce a twofold or n-fold entity, like opposite electron spins in an orbital). 
Reinforcement – i.e., jointed physical entities strengthen the knots by mutually catalyzing 
the elements necessary to each other, so that they form whole that conserves them and constitute 
a new entity that interacts with the surrounding medium in a new global way; the systems 
formed by reinforcement can be stabilized systems or unstable systems, that need to get in the 
environment ever new conditions in order to endure. 
Economy or least dispense – i.e., the feature that knotting and reinforcement are favoured 
because they reduce the losses that each entity in isolation would have through the interactions 
with the surrounding world, as if nature obeyed a principle of least action or as if nature chose 
according to a principle of the good path; instead, nature simply conserves the elements that get 
the conditions for preserving themselves by knotting and reinforcing, while the others disappear 
or enter other wholes in a process of physical natural selection, so to speak. Crocas’s principle 
of eurhythmy goes this way: it speaks about good paths indeed, while avoiding the enchantment 
of teleological concepts. 
An organized system is not a necessary event of nature. It has stochastic processes 
at its base and, for that very reason, is not predictable in a full deterministic way. A sci-
ence of self-organization must deal with non-linear processes and, thus, it has to over-
throw the old Cartesian linear ways of thinking. Yet, only organized structures can last 
and remain in nature, so that we can see the springing of physis as the coming about of 
organized systems in never ending growing degrees of complexity. We reach then a 
pretty different conception about matter. Descartes and modern thinking in general had 
a conception of matter as something which was lying passively under universal and un-
breakable laws. Modern thinking used many times the fiction of God’s legislative will 
in order to understand matter as such a passive substratum. Very suggestively, Descar-
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tes said that God gave His laws to nature as a king to his kingdom. Now we have some 
glimpses at a deeper dimension of matter. They show us matter as a process of self-or-
ganization, i.e., not as something that is just under laws, but as something that creates 
the lawful patterns (or the “forms”) of its own existence. We can finally see physis or 
nature as an ever-growing process of organization; that is to say: a never-ending process 
in which emerging patterns give the basis for the springing of new, more complex pat-
terns, and so on indefinitely (are there laws of breakdown processes beyond a certain 
upper-limit of complexity?) 
How deep does this self-organizing process go? Generally, we perceive it clearly 
in living organisms. But this is already halfway through the story. In order to character-
ize life, we must talk about cycles, i.e., loops of internal processes, replication, i.e., pro-
duction of new similar organisms, agency, i.e., some active imprint in the surroundings, 
and cognizance, i.e., a kind of discernment or sensitivity to the environment. All this 
supposes the more basic processes of knotting and reinforcement, which belong to the 
lower levels of organization processes. Thus, our guess is that organization starts at the 
deepest level, and that all matter is a continual organization process, so that there is 
nothing as naked matter or some substance that is passively under laws (of motion or 
else) which are superimposed unto it. As we see it, when the simpler quantum entity 
springs in the theta-wave of the sub-quantum medium, the photonic acron, this is the 
emergence of organization at the most fundamental level. The photonic acron, while 
having zero rest mass and no charge, is indeed an already complex, organized entity: it 
has a physics that others will describe in this book. 
Let us finish by aligning several insights about what the cosmos seems to be from 
this new point of view. 
1. There is no initial singularity, but an everlasting sub-quantum medium. 
2. There is no creation of the universe in an initial expansion, but a permanent pro-
cess of creation of matter as a perturbation of the sub-quantum medium – this pertur-
bation (whose physics is still to come) is the emergence of the acronic, quantum entity. 
3. There is nothing before space and time, preceding the putative creation of the 
universe, but there is a permanent sub-quantum medium to which the concepts of time 
and space no longer apply. 
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4. In order to describe the complexity of the universe, we do not need to start with 
a violent expansion and to adjust ad hoc the initial parameters in order to recover the 
structure of the existing universe (e.g., the formation of galaxies), reasoning as if the 
development of matter was a blind, mechanistic and all-deterministic process com-
pletely defined in advance by the sole initial conditions; instead, we must follow the 
successive levels of complexity, starting from the fundamental formation of quantum 
entities in the sub-quantum medium and ascending to the upper levels, understanding 
the propensity of matter to create ever new patterns of organization. We must give mat-
ter a chance, so to speak: if we allow, matter will find its way… 
5. Entire universes can spring from the sub-quantum everlasting medium, having 
their complete story, their emergence and downfall; in this process of genesis and de-
struction, it is likely that many worlds have come and are still to come, and not only a 
unique universe, like the Big Bang story parochially suggested us. 
For if we have the modesty to gaze beyond our nose and above our shoulders into 
the immensity of being, it is likely that we come at last to the conviction that there is an 
infinity of ever new worlds, as Giordano Bruno once said (and died for it). 
